The crankiness starts when the symbolic framework quietly becomes an explanatory ontology.

There’s a noticeable slippage from:

**“Thinking of Abraxas this way helps me metabolize the problem of evil.”**

to:

**“My psyche is coherence-regulated, therefore contradictory observations necessarily propagate upward through a hierarchy of beliefs until the God-image must reorganize itself.”**

to:

**“Abraxas is the metaphysically adequate limit-condition toward which this process points.”**

Those are three substantially different claims. The first is introspective and basically unfalsifiable because it concerns the author’s experience. The second introduces a fairly elaborate psychological architecture—attachment-, esteem-, narrative-, control-, and coherence-regulated “psychotypes”—and confidently uses it to explain addiction, relationships, political thinkers, interpersonal conflict, and responses to metaphysics. The third starts treating the resulting symbolic system as if it tracks the actual structure of reality.

That’s where the crank meter starts moving.

There are several particularly good examples. The author speculates that his psychological organization may be partly explained by genetics **or astrology via natal and progressed charts**; describes himself through Saturnian, Dionysian, and Mercurial “energies”; treats synchronicity as potentially significant; and eventually says he feels “deep in my bones” that the divine really is a totality of good and evil and that human beings possess consciousness because this divine totality lacks it. At that point Abraxas is doing more than supplying imagery for an existential posture.

The footnotes crank it further. The “stabilizer” taxonomy is applied as though it were an established psychological model capable of explaining why different kinds of drug addicts behave differently, why psychedelics are especially dangerous for a supposed “coherence-regulated” subtype, and why another writer might eventually undergo “late-stage symbolic fracture.” That has the *form* of technical psychology—categories, causal mechanisms, predictions—without showing anything like the evidential infrastructure that would normally justify that confidence.

And then there’s the wonderfully maximalist move where the personal Abraxian realization becomes political counterintelligence. Accepting the unity of opposites supposedly allows the individual to exit the “noetic commons” controlled by elites, strips elites of their monopoly on the Good, forces them to reveal their predatory nature, and constitutes “the ultimate asymmetric warfare of the psyche.” At that point:

> “I found a symbolic language that reduced my existential distress”

has become something resembling

> “I have discovered a psychic technology that makes the soul resistant to elite ideological capture.”

**That** is much more recognizably crank.

So I’d separate the Abraxas thesis itself from the system constructed around it. “The privatio boni doesn’t adequately express my experience of evil, and Abraxas gives me a more psychologically livable symbol of totality” is perfectly intelligible religious/philosophical autobiography. You don't have to believe it, but calling it crank just because it is Jungian would be too easy.

The crankier part is the repeated conversion of **private phenomenological fit into privileged structural knowledge**. Because the framework feels more coherent to this particular psyche, coherence increasingly becomes evidence that the framework describes the psyche in general, then human personality types, then metaphysical reality, then political power, then elite ideological control.

That escalation—not merely saying “Abraxas”—is where I’d locate the crank content.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5894788&forum_id=2)#50077293)