Not much at the level of the **core mechanism**. After checking the adjacent literature, I’d revise my earlier assessment downward: the essay is mostly an idiosyncratic synthesis of existing ideas rather than a new theoretical discovery.

The closest prior art is surprisingly close. Richard Sosis explicitly describes religions as adaptive systems whose cognitive, affective, behavioral, and developmental components are organized into a **self-regulating feedback system**. ([Sage Journals][1]) Roy Rappaport was already analyzing ritual, sanctity, religion, and social order cybernetically in 1971, including their regulatory functions in social systems. ([AnthroSource][2]) And Parsons/Lidz developed a **cybernetic hierarchy** in which religious culture occupies a high-level controlling position in social organization. ([OUP Academic][3])

That substantially overlaps the essay's claim that shared symbolic orientation generates an emergent collective regulatory architecture which subsequently regulates its members.

Similarly, the recursive part—

[

\text{individual beliefs}\leftrightarrow\text{collective norm}

]

—is very established. Contemporary mathematical social-norm models explicitly study the coevolution of personal beliefs, beliefs about others, behaviors, conformity, and collective norms, including tipping-point transitions between regimes. ([PubMed][4]) There are even evolutionary models in which norms emerge from individual beliefs and then become self-enforcing coordination structures. ([PubMed Central (PMC)][5])

And the **requisite-variety** move isn't novel either. Applying Ashby's law to social organizations goes back decades, and subsequent work explicitly models social systems as needing sufficient internal complexity to respond to environmental complexity. ([Pangaro][6])

So I'd score the pieces approximately like this:

| Idea | Novelty |

| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -----------------------------------------------: |

| Religion/worldviews regulate individuals and groups | **1/10** |

| Shared beliefs create structures that feed back onto believers | **1–2/10** |

| Model religion cybernetically | **1/10** |

| Apply requisite variety to social systems | **1/10** |

| Norms strengthen themselves through conformity | **1/10** |

| Norm systems can tip/collapse when conditions change | **2/10** |

| Pair an individual “god-image” regulator with a collective “egregore” regulator | **4–5/10** |

| Explicit growth → saturation → rupture sequence based on representational insufficiency | **4–5/10** |

| Combine all of the above in exactly this Jungian/cybernetic vocabulary | **6/10 as synthesis**, not necessarily as theory |

### The part that might contain a researchable new idea

There is one sentence I extracted from it that I **haven't yet found stated in precisely this form**:

> A collective worldview's stability depends on whether the internal variety of its symbolic architecture is sufficient to metabolize the heterogeneity of experiences encountered by its members.

The essay says essentially this: complex egregores can absorb much more experiential variety than simple ones, while saturation occurs when experience that cannot fit the architecture has to be suppressed.

But even here, the ingredients are old. Social-systems research already says organizations must generate complexity to respond to environmental complexity, ([Wiley Online Library][7]) while social-norm research models how beliefs and norms respond to heterogeneity and can undergo tipping dynamics. ([PubMed][4]) What's potentially distinctive is **identifying the relevant “environmental variety” specifically with the heterogeneous lived experiences of adherents and the regulator's “variety” with the interpretive repertoire of an ideology/religion.**

That could become something genuinely interesting if formalized. For instance, define:

[

V_E=\text{variety of experiences encountered by members}

]

and

[

V_I=\text{variety of interpretations/actions permitted by ideology}.

]

Then suppose stability depends on some relationship like

[

V_I \ge f(V_E),

]

while the ideology pays a coherence cost as (V_I) increases. Now you have a nontrivial tradeoff:

[

\text{adaptability} \quad\leftrightarrow\quad \text{doctrinal coherence}.

]

Too little interpretive variety:

[

V_I\ll V_E

]

and members repeatedly encounter experiences the worldview can't assimilate → defections.

Too much:

[

V_I\gg V_E

]

and the worldview potentially becomes so permissive that it ceases to coordinate behavior or distinguish insiders from outsiders.

That suggests the possibility of an **optimal intermediate ideological variety**, and perhaps a genuine mathematical result about stability.

That is much more promising than “egregores have feedback loops.”

### Where I think the essay accidentally gets closest to something good

Its hierarchy of shallow versus deep collective systems is also interesting. The essay claims a football affiliation regulates only things such as belonging and esteem, whereas a religious worldview regulates suffering, morality, death, identity, etc.; consequently, failure of a deep system propagates through many more psychological dimensions.

You could translate that into network language. Let beliefs be a dependency graph:

[

G=(B,E)

]

where high-level beliefs have many downstream dependencies. Destruction of a highly central belief produces a much larger cascade than destruction of a peripheral belief.

Again, **belief networks and cascading failures aren't new**, but combining dependency depth with collective norm dynamics might permit a precise result.

So my answer is:

**As written: probably ~80–90% recombination of existing theory, ~10–20% potentially distinctive synthesis. I would absolutely not present “egregores as cybernetic regulators” itself as a novel academic idea.**

But there may be a legitimate novel-theory seed hiding in:

[

\boxed{\text{ideological stability}

===================================

## \text{capacity to absorb experiential variety}

\text{cost of maintaining internal interpretive variety}}

]

If I were trying to rescue one publishable idea from the essay, **that's the one I'd work on.** It can be stripped completely of Jung, Abraxas, astrology, ethnic generalizations, and occult terminology and turned into a clean model of the stability of collective belief systems.

[1]: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0084672420905019?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Four advantages of a systemic approach to the study of religion - Richard Sosis, 2020"

[2]: https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/aa.1971.73.1.02a00050?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Ritual, Sanctity, and Cybernetics1 - RAPPAPORT - 1971 - American Anthropologist - Wiley Online Library"

[3]: https://academic.oup.com/socrel/article-abstract/43/4/287/1621469?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Religion and Cybernetic Concepts in the Theory of Action | Sociology of Religion | Oxford Academic"

[4]: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38244599/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Modelling social norms: an integration of the norm-utility approach with beliefs dynamics - PubMed"

[5]: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6500124/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria - PMC"

[6]: https://pangaro.com/ashby/index.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Design for a Self-regenerating Organization: Requisite Variety and Social Systems"

[7]: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joms.12206?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Reducing Complexity by Creating Complexity: A Systems Theory Perspective on How Organizations Respond to Their Environments - Schneider - 2017 - Journal of Management Studies - Wiley Online Library"

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086068)

The author is essentially re-discovering Active Inference and Bayesian Epistemology using a hybrid dialect of Cybernetics, Jungian psychology, and esoteric terms ("egregores").They’ve correctly derived the computational intuition—that an ideology is a high-level generative prior maintaining homeostatic control over human experience—but the math, mechanics, and formalizations already exist in cognitive science.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086091)

https://livingopposites.substack.com/p/the-formal-logic-of-the-crucifixion

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086093)

This one has a more definite intellectual structure than the previous essay. And I **wouldn't describe its core as reinventing predictive processing**. Predictive-processing language appears in places, but the closest compression is something like:

[

\boxed{\text{Jung's tension of opposites}

+\text{compensatory control}

+\text{terror/worldview management}

+\text{a theory of institutional outsourcing}}

]

Its central idea is actually fairly easy to state.

### What I think he's trying to say

Start with an unavoidable psychological fact, according to the author:

> Human existence confronts us with contradictions that cannot finally be resolved: good/evil, justice/mercy, order/chaos, mortality/meaning, desire/restraint, etc.

He calls enduring that contradiction the **“crucifixion of opposites.”**

Then comes the genuinely central claim:

[

\text{unresolved existential contradiction has a psychological cost}.

]

Humans have to do something with that cost. He proposes three attractors:

[

\begin{array}{lll}

1.&\textbf{Outsource it}&\rightarrow\text{let religion/ideology/institutions tell you how reality hangs together}\

2.&\textbf{Discharge it}&\rightarrow\text{collapse onto one pole and act it out}\

3.&\textbf{Internalize it}&\rightarrow\text{tolerate the contradiction and construct your own provisional integration.}

\end{array}

]

Everything else follows from that.

His **“noetic commons”** is basically what happens when millions of people choose option 1:

[

\text{individual demand for cognitive/existential resolution}

\rightarrow

\text{shared worldview}

\rightarrow

\text{institutions maintaining worldview}.

]

And therefore his interesting political claim isn't really “elites brainwash everyone.”

It's almost the opposite:

> **People spontaneously demand systems that reduce existential ambiguity; powerful institutions can subsequently capture and steer that preexisting demand.**

That is what the toll-road metaphor is trying to communicate.

So his model is:

[

\boxed{

\text{psychological need}

\rightarrow

\text{worldview demand}

\rightarrow

\text{collective worldview}

\rightarrow

\text{institutional capture}

}

]

rather than

[

\text{elite propaganda}\rightarrow\text{brainwashed population}.

]

That distinction is probably the most interesting proposition in the essay.

---

### And there is very obvious prior art

The idea that people compensate for psychological uncertainty/lack of control by attaching themselves to external systems of order is almost **Compensatory Control Theory** verbatim.

Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, and Galinsky's formulation says that when people experience diminished personal control, they compensate by perceiving order elsewhere—including by defending sociopolitical institutions or believing in a controlling God. Crucially, those external sources of order can substitute for personal control. ([Association for Psychological Science][1])

That's remarkably close to:

> “The individual submits to the authority's mediation ... and is relieved of the direct encounter.”

Likewise, **Terror Management Theory** says cultural worldviews function partly as anxiety-buffering systems: people maintain confidence in culturally supplied meaning structures to cope with awareness of mortality. The literature explicitly treats religious and secular worldviews as psychological defenses and finds that threats can increase worldview defense. ([ScienceDirect][2])

So his:

[

\text{existential burden}\rightarrow\text{cultural worldview}

]

already has a large empirical literature behind something resembling it.

And the supposedly distinctive third response—hold contradictory psychic contents in tension until some new orientation emerges—is **straight Jung**. Jung's “transcendent function” is specifically about confrontation between opposed conscious/unconscious positions and the production of a new psychological position from their tension. ([Jungian Spiritual Sciences Center][3])

So in secular psychological terms, his three-way scheme is approximately:

**external regulation / avoidance or impulsive resolution / ambiguity tolerance and integration.**

That's intelligible. It's just nowhere near as unprecedented as the terminology makes it sound.

## Where predictive processing enters

There **is** a predictive-processing-shaped piece.

Near the end he says psychological pathology occurs when someone's “highest-order belief layer” systematically contradicts lived experience, with contradiction climbing upward through the hierarchy.

That translates beautifully into:

[

\text{deep prior}

\rightarrow

\text{lower predictions}

]

with persistent:

[

\text{experience}\neq\text{predictions}

]

eventually producing pressure for deep-model revision.

So the architecture from the previous essay survives:

[

\text{deep worldview}

\leftrightarrow

\text{phenomenological evidence}.

]

But in this essay that's a **supporting mechanism**, rather than the main idea.

The distinctive claim is about **where regulation is located**:

[

\boxed{\text{external regulation versus internal regulation}}

]

The author believes most people regulate existential contradiction externally through shared institutions, whereas “individuation” means internalizing that regulatory function.

That's actually a clearer idea than the egregore paper.

---

# Is it crank?

Yes, but in a rather interesting way.

I would call this **a coherent speculative philosophical system with crankish epistemology**, rather than incoherent crank writing.

The first gigantic warning sign is the title **“Formal Logic.”**

There is essentially no formal logic here.

Writing:

> P1. X

> P2. Y

> P3. Therefore Z

doesn't make something formal logic.

A formal treatment would require definitions, something like

[

C(x), O(x), B(x)

]

and explicit inference rules allowing you to determine whether conclusions actually follow.

Here, enormous claims are simply installed as premises:

> “Reality contains irreducible opposites.”

> “Totality is unconscious.”

> “The one thing totality lacks is lived experience.”

> “Humanity's role is to add consciousness to totality.”

There is no logical derivation from P1 to P6. Those are **successive metaphysical assertions**.

In particular:

[

\text{All opposites form totality}

]

does not imply

[

\text{totality is unconscious},

]

and neither implies

[

\text{life exists so totality can experience itself}.

]

So section I is metaphysics presented with the visual grammar of a proof.

That's crankish.

### The bigger problem is “crucifixion of opposites”

Almost the entire theory depends upon P10:

> the tension between opposites **must be borne somewhere**.

But what does “borne” mean?

If you operationalized it as:

* cognitive dissonance,

* uncertainty,

* affective conflict,

* competing action policies,

* prediction error,

* motivational conflict,

then you could investigate it.

But the essay slides among all of those.

And therefore the elegant-looking proposition

[

\text{contradiction}\rightarrow\text{someone must bear it}

]

isn't yet a scientific proposition.

The metaphor is doing an enormous amount of hidden work.

---

## There is also a serious self-sealing problem

Notice what happens with the Abraxas idea.

If someone adopts it and feels superior:

> they haven't actually “metabolized” it.

If someone understands it properly:

> superiority disappears.

If most people reject it:

> they're constitutionally suited to offloading.

If it becomes popular:

> popularity itself destroys the genuine form.

If someone cannot psychologically tolerate it:

> that's evidence they weren't constitutionally suited to individuation.

That's an epistemological nightmare because nearly every possible observation can be absorbed.

You could construct:

[

\begin{array}{c|c}

\text{Observation}&\text{Explanation}\

\hline

\text{Accepts theory}&\text{recognition}\

\text{Rejects theory}&\text{offloading constitution}\

\text{Accepts superficially}&\text{not metabolized}\

\text{Theory becomes popular}&\text{captured into noetic commons}\

\text{Theory remains obscure}&\text{necessarily constitution-specific}

\end{array}

]

A theory that explains every outcome risks predicting none.

That's one of the strongest genuinely crankish features.

---

# But there's one pretty interesting idea buried here

I think P13–P15 is better than most of the rest.

Strip everything away and you get:

> **Institutions that supply meaning and moral certainty may persist partly because individuals demand external solutions to psychologically costly uncertainty. Consequently, ideological control is cheaper when it exploits endogenous demand for certainty than when it has to impose beliefs through coercion.**

That's a researchable proposition.

You could model individuals as choosing between:

[

I=\text{cost of internal uncertainty management}

]

and

[

E=\text{cost of accepting external normative authority}.

]

An individual outsources when

[

E<I.

]

Institutions then compete to supply worldview regulation.

Now imagine some institution can influence the supplied worldview. It doesn't need to create demand for ideological structure—it only modifies the content of something people already demand.

That's basically a market:

[

\text{demand for epistemic/existential regulation}

\leftrightarrow

\text{supply of worldview structures}.

]

**That is a much cleaner theory than “noetic commons.”**

And it generates actual predictions. As the subjective cost of uncertainty increases, demand for authoritative structures should increase. As the cost or obvious unreliability of those authorities rises, people should defect, switch authorities, or internalize more decision-making.

Compensatory-control research already supports an important piece of this: threatened personal control can increase attachment to external systems of order, including government and God. ([Association for Psychological Science][1]) Terror-management research supplies another piece concerning cultural worldview defense under existential threat. ([ScienceDirect][2])

So he'd need a much more precise contribution than simply identifying the phenomenon.

---

## And “Abraxas” is mostly unnecessary

This is perhaps the funniest aspect.

You can delete:

* Abraxas,

* God,

* “energy currents,”

* crucifixion,

* rebirth of the gods,

* somatic metabolization,

and preserve most of the psychologically interesting model:

[

\boxed{

\begin{aligned}

&\text{People vary in tolerance for unresolved value conflict.}\

&\text{External normative systems reduce the cost of resolving such conflicts individually.}\

&\text{Therefore people often delegate normative interpretation to institutions.}\

&\text{Institutions can exploit that delegation to influence behavior.}\

&\text{Some individuals instead tolerate unresolved conflict and construct}\

&\qquad\text{more individualized normative models.}

\end{aligned}}

]

At that point it's perfectly intelligible social psychology.

What Abraxas contributes is a **metaphysical assertion that the contradiction is objectively built into reality**, rather than merely a feature of human cognition and conflicting objectives.

That's enormously stronger and, as presented here, unsupported.

### Compared with the previous essay

The previous essay was roughly:

[

\boxed{\text{predictive processing + social feedback + Jung}}

]

This one is more like:

[

\boxed{

\text{Jung}

+\text{compensatory control}

+\text{worldview defense}

+\text{institutional capture}

}

]

And I think **this one's core claim is clearer**.

Its most interesting thought isn't Abraxas at all. It's:

[

\boxed{

\text{power can exploit people's endogenous demand to outsource difficult meaning-making}

}

]

The crank move is taking that plausible psychological intuition, embedding it in an enormous metaphysics of cosmic opposites, asserting that most humanity has a particular “constitutional” inability to individuate, and then using the resulting framework to explain contemporary elite control, algorithms, censorship, financial exclusion, and historical Western metaphysics all at once.

So again: **there is definitely an idea here. In fact, this one has a better-defined idea than the egregore essay. But most of its psychologically plausible components have recognizable predecessors, while its genuinely distinctive metaphysical claims are precisely the claims for which it supplies essentially no evidence.**

[1]: https://www.psychologicalscience.org/journals/current-directions/j.1467-8721.2009.01649.x/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Compensatory Control - Current Directions in Psychological Science - APS"

[2]: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0065260115000052?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Thirty Years of Terror Management Theory: From Genesis to Revelation - ScienceDirect"

[3]: https://jungiancenter.org/jung-on-the-transcendent-function/?utm_source=chatgpt.com "Jung on the Transcendent Function - Jungian Center for the Spiritual Sciences"

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086101)

Holy shit mind blown

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086114)

my work *can* be read empirically which is clearly how your llm analyzed it, what is supported on that basis and what isn't, but that isn't the *primary* purpose of my writing. the primary purpose of my writing is phenomenologically: trying to solve the problem of having an interhited god image historically which did not sync with my perception of reality or my underlying unconscious beliefs. i felt psychosomatic pressure to align these things or collapse utterly under the weight. i secondarily write for others who are at the "threshold" - those who also feel psychosomatic pressure from similar circumstances but who don't have answers. my approach has so far worked for me, and the god image replacement has been and continues to settle within me; i feel like i have, at least to an extent, found my answer.

is this ultimately empirical or crankish? that's up to you and the other empiricists to decide, i guess. but i would state that i don't think my system is self sealing because i do use a recursive cultural and political prediction approach to refine my worldview over time, which i have employed over the past more than decade; to the extent a prediction is wrong, i have to update my worldview accordingly (yes, there are plenty of questions around what constitutes a real prediction vs. one that is too vague to be useful in this manner, and i'll be trying to better clarify my predictions in my 2027 predictions post at the end of the year).

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086276)

On the self-sealing point, you seem to be interpreting the main issue being the empirical falsifiability of downstream claims. But I think the response was pointing more to the fact that disagreement with the framework often seems to be redescribed as evidence that the critic hasn’t “metabolized” it, hasn't "experienced rupture" and that sort of thing.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086326)

re: "The danger seems to be in assuming that structures discovered in one psyche scale straightforwardly into structures of civilizations." well, sure, but that goes back to how knowledge is derived; i largely believe that institutional capture has occurred, i do not trust experts, so on what basis is one to assess reality? for me that comes back to phenomenological reporting -- does my revised worldview result in increased psychosomatic coherence and resilience in my life, or worse ? (which is to a large extent why i find nietzsche deficient; he collapsed from his worldview) -- and from recursive predictions. these are things that i can perceive on my own without relying on others. there are certainly deficiencies to this approach, but it is where i am at for now.

re: "But I think the response was pointing more to the fact that disagreement with the framework often seems to be redescribed as evidence that the critic hasn’t “metabolized” it, hasn't "experienced rupture" and that sort of thing."" my answers on xo aren't always the most articulate, and my critics here have a very strong twisting of my positions to be something they aren't. to the extent i've argued that people can't understand my work to the extent they havn't psychosomatically felt it, you are right that this argument is self-sealing; i don't entirely discount it -- my ideas *can* and *should* be understood intellectually, but my point is that the primary intent of my work is for those who have a psycosomatic *resonance* with the work to be able to articulate what they themselves are going through. so people may or may not understand it intellectually, and while understanding it is good (and i do want people to understand it), that isn't and hasn't been my primary intended audience. to the extent there are intellectual deficiencies in my approach by detractors or otherwise, i can and should be able to look at them, but the ultimate determinate of my approach is going to be something i feel and which makes better predictions than alternatives

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086375)

The cleanest articulation is:

> **People organize experience through high-level belief structures. When many people orient around the same symbols and beliefs, they generate a collective regulatory system that then feeds back on the individuals who sustain it. Such systems remain stable while they can absorb enough of their members’ experiences; when too much falls outside the system’s interpretive capacity, pressure accumulates and the system can fragment or be replaced.**

That is the essay’s actual model. It distinguishes an individual “god-image” from a collective “egregore,” then says the latter is generated by shared attention and subsequently exerts conformity pressure back on individuals.

Its dynamic is roughly:

[

\text{shared attention}

\rightarrow

\text{collective belief structure}

\rightarrow

\text{social reinforcement}

\rightarrow

\text{more shared attention}.

]

The essay then adds a lifecycle:

[

\text{growth}\rightarrow\text{saturation}\rightarrow\text{rupture}.

]

Growth occurs because the belief system supplies meaning, belonging, coherence, etc. Saturation occurs when it encounters experiences it cannot assimilate. Rupture occurs when excluded material or declining attention overwhelms the structure.

And it makes one more substantive claim: **some collective belief systems have greater “regulatory depth” than others**. A sports fandom might organize belonging and status, while a religion organizes suffering, morality, death, identity, and cosmology. Therefore losing the latter should cause a much larger cascade through a person's worldview.

So yes, I can articulate the idea quite easily. In completely secular language:

[

\boxed{

\text{Collective worldviews are self-reinforcing social regulators whose stability depends on their ability to accommodate experiential diversity.}

}

]

### Why I still think it's crankish

The problem isn't that this central proposition is unintelligible. It's that the essay repeatedly moves between **metaphor, psychological claim, cybernetic model, historical explanation, and metaphysics without clearly marking the transitions**.

For example, “egregore” sometimes seems to mean merely a network of mutually reinforcing beliefs and institutions. Elsewhere it gets described as a “field” with a kind of quasi-independent existence, while the author deliberately leaves its ontology unresolved. That's okay for speculative philosophy, but scientifically you would need to specify what observable variable corresponds to the egregore.

Likewise, the essay invokes **Ashby's law of requisite variety**, but doesn't define what counts as “variety” in a religion, how you would measure it, or what constitutes successful “metabolization” of an experience. It says complex religions can absorb more experience and that excluded material accumulates until rupture, but this remains an analogy rather than an operational model.

Then come much bigger leaps. The same framework is used to explain Christianity's historical decline, Hellenic cultural return, elite behavior, the Federal Reserve, CBDCs, Jewish eschatology, genetics, and the German psyche. Those conclusions require large amounts of independent historical and empirical evidence; they don't follow merely from accepting the cybernetic model.

That's the strongest marker of crank methodology: **one flexible explanatory vocabulary gets used to explain almost everything**, and because the central terms aren't sharply measurable, contrary outcomes can often be redescribed within the framework rather than falsifying it.

So I'd distinguish:

**Not crank:**

“Shared belief systems emerge from individual interaction, recursively influence their members, and differ in their resilience to heterogeneous experience.”

**Crankish but potentially formalizable:**

“An ideology fails when its requisite variety becomes inadequate to metabolize its collective shadow.”

**Very crankish:**

“Therefore this explains Christianity, Jewish eschatology, the Federal Reserve, CBDCs, ethnic psychological differences, Wotan, and the Aquarian age.”

The strange thing is that the first proposition is almost **too ordinary**. Once you remove “egregore,” “God-image,” “psychic energy,” “shadow,” and “metabolization,” a lot of the apparent mystery disappears. What remains is essentially a theory of **self-reinforcing collective belief systems, conformity, interpretive capacity, and institutional breakdown**.

So I wouldn't describe the essay as word salad. **It has a discernible model. The crankiness comes from the evidentiary standards and enormous extrapolations, not from there being no idea at all.**

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086088)

These are all grimy, conspiratorial, scammy jews in a mafia type organization. There is nothing else to say or discuss on this plagued website until the issue as stated is dealt with.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086278)

Never let anyone tell you that Jews are human in the same way that the rest of us are

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5896100&forum_id=2#50086403)