SCALIA MAD AS FUCK IN THIS DISSENT
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Date: November 11th, 2015 12:51 PM Author: sticky mother
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and
JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
On December 30, 2005, Congress enacted the Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA). It unambiguously provides that, as
of that date, “no court, justice, or judge” shall have jurisdiction to consider the habeas application of a Guantanamo Bay detainee. Notwithstanding this plain directive, the Court today concludes that, on what it calls the statute’s most natural reading, every “court, justice, or judge” before whom such a habeas application was pending on December 30 has jurisdiction to hear, consider, and render judgment on it. This conclusion is patently erroneous.
And even if it were not, the jurisdiction supposedly
retained should, in an exercise of sound equitable discretion, not be exercised.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3041954&forum_id=2#29158838) |
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Date: November 11th, 2015 1:08 PM Author: sticky mother
1The Court apparently believes that the effective-date provision means nothing at all. “That paragraph (1), along with paragraphs (2) and (3), is to ‘take effect on the date of enactment,’ DTA §1005(h)(1), 119 Stat. 2743, is not dispositive,” says the Court, ante, at 14, n. 9. The Court’s authority for this conclusion is its quote from INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 317 (2001), to the effect that “a statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.” Ante, at 14, n. 9 (emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted). But this quote merely restates the obvious: An effective-date provision
does not render a statute applicable to “conduct that occurred at an earlier date,” but of course it renders the statute applicable to conduct that occurs on the effective date and all future dates—such as the
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction here. The Court seems to suggest that, because the effective-date provision does not authorize retroactive application, it also fails to authorize prospective application (and is thus useless verbiage). This cannot be true
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=3041954&forum_id=2#29158955) |
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