Date: September 28th, 2022 7:13 PM
Author: 180 burgundy indian lodge boistinker
As a general proposition, an agency may not augment its appropriations
from outside sources without specific statutory authority. When Congress
makes an appropriation, it also is establishing an authorized program level.
In other words, it is telling the agency that it cannot operate beyond the
level that it can finance under its appropriation. To permit an agency to
operate beyond this level with funds derived from some other source
without specific congressional sanction would amount to a usurpation of
the congressional prerogative. Restated, the objective of the rule against
augmentation of appropriations is to prevent a government agency from undercutting the congressional power of the purse by circuitously
exceeding the amount Congress has appropriated for that activity. As one
recent decision put it:
“When Congress establishes a new program or activity, it
also must decide how to finance it. Typically it does this by
appropriating funds from the U.S. Treasury. In addition to
providing necessary funds, a congressional appropriation
establishes a maximum authorized program level, meaning
that an agency cannot, absent statutory authorization,
operate beyond the level that can be paid for by its
appropriations. An agency may not circumvent these
limitations by augmenting its appropriations from sources
outside the government. One of the objectives of these
limitations is to prevent agencies from avoiding or usurping
Congress’ ‘power of the purse.”
B-300248, Jan. 15, 2004 (citations omitted).
There is no statute which, in those precise terms, prohibits the
augmentation of appropriated funds. The concept does nevertheless have
an adequate statutory basis, although it must be derived from several
separate enactments. Specifically:
• 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), the “miscellaneous receipts” statute.
• 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a), restricting the use of appropriated funds to their
intended purposes. Early Comptroller of the Treasury decisions often
based the augmentation prohibition on the combined effect of 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3302(b) and 1301(a). See, e.g., 17 Comp. Dec. 712 (1911); 9 Comp.
Dec. 174 (1902).
• 18 U.S.C. § 209, which prohibits the payment of, contribution to, or
supplementation of the salary of a government officer or employee as
compensation for his or her official duties from any source other than
the government of the United States.
The augmentation concept manifests itself in a wide variety of contexts.
One application is the prohibition against transfers between appropriations
without specific statutory authority. An unauthorized transfer is an
improper augmentation of the receiving appropriation. E.g., 23 Comp.
Gen. 694 (1944); B-206668, Mar. 15, 1982. In B-206668, a department received a General Administration appropriation plus separate
appropriations for the administration of its component bureaus. The
unauthorized transfer of funds from the bureau appropriations to the
General Administration appropriation was held to be an improper
augmentation of the latter appropriation. Likewise, the Department of
Labor illegally augmented its departmental management account by
“pooling” funds from component appropriations in order to purchase
computer equipment where the costs borne by the components far
exceeded the value of the equipment they received. 70 Comp. Gen. 592
(1991). The Comptroller General rejected the Department’s
characterization of this transaction as a “reprogramming,” viewing it
instead as an unauthorized transfer among appropriations.
As with the transfer prohibition itself, however, the augmentation rule has
no application at the agency allotment level within the same appropriation
account. 70 Comp. Gen. 601 (1991). It also should be apparent that the
augmentation rule is related to the concept of purpose availability. A very
early case pointed out that charging a general appropriation when a
specific appropriation is exhausted not only violates 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) by
using the general appropriation for an unauthorized purpose, but also
improperly augments the specific appropriation. [1] Bowler, First Comp.
Dec. 257, 258 (1894). However, the augmentation rule is most closely
related to the subject of this chapter—availability as to amount—because it
has the effect of restricting executive spending to the amounts
appropriated by Congress. In this respect, it is a logical, perhaps
indispensable, complement to the Antideficiency Act.
For the most part, although the cases are not entirely consistent, GAO has
distinguished between receipts of money and receipts of services, dealing
with the former under the augmentation rule and the latter under the
voluntary services prohibition (31 U.S.C. § 1342).150 For example, in
B-13378, Nov. 20, 1940, a private organization was willing to donate either
funds or services. Since the agency lacked statutory authority to accept
gifts, acceptance of a cash donation would improperly augment its
appropriations. Acceptance of services was distinguished, however, and
addressed in relation to the limits on acceptance of voluntary services set
forth in 31 U.S.C. § 1342. GAO drew the same distinction in B-125406,
Nov. 4, 1955. See also B-287738, May 16, 2002, distinguishing between agency acceptance of money as compensation for damage to government
property, which would constitute an augmentation if retained in agency
appropriations, and acceptance of actual repairs to the property, which
would be permissible.151
In apparent conflict with these cases, however, is B-211079.2, Jan. 2, 1987,
which stated that, without statutory authority, an agency would improperly
augment its appropriations by accepting the uncompensated services of
“workfare” participants to do work which would normally be done by the
agency with its own personnel and funds. Logic would seem to support the
formulation in B-211079.2. Certainly, if I wash your car without charge or if
I give you money to have it washed, the result is the same—the car gets
washed and your own money is free to be used for something else. Be that
as it may, the majority of the cases support limiting the augmentation rule
to the receipt of money. In the final analysis, the distinction probably
makes little practical difference. In view of 31 U.S.C. § 1342, limiting the
augmentation rule to the receipt of funds does not mean that the rule can
be negated by the unrestricted acceptance of services.152
In a 1991 case, 70 Comp. Gen. 597, GAO concluded that the then Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) would not improperly augment its
appropriations by permitting private carriers to install computer equipment
at the ICC headquarters, to facilitate access to electronically filed rate
tariffs. Installation was viewed as a reasonable exercise of the ICC’s
statutory authority to prescribe the form and manner of tariff filing by
those over whom the agency has regulatory authority. Somewhat similar inconcept to the workfare case, however, the decision suggests that use of
the equipment for other purposes, such as word processing by ICC staff,
would be an improper augmentation, and advised the ICC to establish
controls to prevent this. See also B-277521, July 31, 1997 (granting the
Radio and TV Correspondents Association a permit to locate equipment in
the Capitol in order to broadcast events would not constitute an
augmentation of congressional appropriations since the equipment is not
for official business use of the government).
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5201464&forum_id=2#45247047)