Date: May 22nd, 2026 2:56 PM
Author: Consuela
I tried reading Wittgenstein and was hoping to like him - his concept of “hinge proposition” is adjacent to my conception of the God image (what must be in place for doubt to be possible, what beliefs are not held as propositions but acted on) - but unfortunately I was repelled from pretty much the very first words of his Tractatus (and his later work, despite being closer to my concerns, still operates in a register I find difficult to inhabit). I attribute this to two primary reasons:
1. My framework is not built from the top down on logical deductions from first principles (logic → experience). It emerges from the bottom up abductively from lived experience, tested against recursive prediction and somatic coherence (experience → logic). This is a structural constraint, not a preference.
2. The Tractatus is the polar opposite of my method: it offers logical coherence without phenomenological grounding, using deductions from axioms to conclusions, with no phenomenological input and no empirical testing. For a coherence-regulated constitution under high contradiction load, this feels like "floating in the void" because it cannot metabolize the tension my body already registers. Later Wittgenstein seems to acknowledge this problem and undermines his earlier work, but he is still performing primarily an epistemological inquiry, not a phenomenological one. It's about the logic of certainty, not the experience of it.
Unfortunately, even though late Wittgenstein and I may have a decent amount in common regarding how belief underlies arguments - that the observer’s biases are always included in the observations being made, a second order cybernetic approach - his thinking style just doesn’t jive with my own.
(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5868154&forum_id=2#49894495)