Date: June 19th, 2026 12:16 AM Author: the White jensen huang
the huge gaming companies are so ridiculously bloated with waste fraud and abuse. they're like academia. completely infested with unqualified dead weight who are clinging to their sinecures
there is no way any of those companies are actually making money if you strip away all their accounting and financial hijinks
Date: June 19th, 2026 8:28 PM Author: Marvelous parlour
AAA actually is Crashing imho. Lots of Blame to go around. Diversity Coordinators, Monetization Coordinators, Franchise Alignment Coordinators, Brand Safety Coordinators, Engagement Optimizers, Battle Pass Economists, narrative committees, external consultants, internal consultants, Engineering teams that somehow need seven years to render a man climbing a yellow ledge, and a publisher brave enough to charge $79.99 for the privilege of watching the whole thing compile into beige.
The old industry made Games. The new industry makes strategic content vessels. Huge Teams. Huge Budgets.
Hugh Prices. No shipping discipline. No taste. No shame. And then the thing launches at 62 on Metacritic, gets a “mixed” Steam rating, misses internal expectations, is patched for six months by shell-shocked Engineers, gets a “we hear you” roadmap, then the studio is closed by a man using the word “reprioritize," that is the business now and gaming revenue is gigantic which is the fake comfort and the corpse is in the premium AAA model.
Huge Teams. Huge Budgets. Hugh Prices. Huge Losses. And the Losses have only grown Huger. Losses back in the day weren't nearly as catastrophic imo:
2009–2015: The old failure regime
Bionic Commando — Revenue: $18M | Budget: $45M | Loss: $27M | Capcom reboot nobody needed; a mechanical arm wrapped around an invoice.
Avatar: Frontiers of Pandora — Revenue: $125M | Budget: $220M | Loss: $95M | Gorgeous jungle, no necessity.
Homeworld 3 — Revenue: $18M | Budget: $70M | Loss: $52M | Legendary PC name, modern commercial faceplant.
Test Drive Unlimited Solar Crown — Revenue: $10M | Budget: $65M | Loss: $55M | Open-world racing without a reason.
MultiVersus relaunch — Revenue: $25M | Budget: $100M | Loss: $75M | Warner found a way to make Bugs Bunny financially ominous.
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2020–2026 selected failure pool: Revenue $1.942B | Budget $5.230B | Loss $3.288B | Average loss $74.7M per failed game.
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There it is.
And that understates it, because the new failure also vaporizes six years, a roadmap, a hiring plan, a brand, a studio, and the next game that never gets greenlit. A 2009 flop was a mistake. A 2026 flop is six years of executive consensus, swollen payroll, brittle technology, consultant paste, content-roadmap delusion, monetization desperation, IP strip-mining, and a launch price that makes the customer feel like he is being asked to pay tuition at a mediocre private college.
The customer looks at $79.99 and thinks: no.
He has Fortnite. He has Roblox. He has Minecraft. He has Steam sales. He has Game Pass. He has a backlog. He has Balatro. He has Helldivers. He has Elden Ring. He has old games that still work. He has indies made by six people with taste. He has AA games that do not need a compliance department to invent a protagonist. AAA’s problem is not that games got expensive. AAA’s problem is that games got expensive and worse at the same time.
The old model was: make a game, sell the game, maybe make another.
The new model is: spend $220M, chase engagement, add store, add pass, add roadmap, add consultants, add multiplayer, add metrics, add franchise synergy, remove joy, ship late, sell badly, blame market conditions, fire staff, repeat.
Huge Teams.
Huge Budgets.
Hugh Prices.
Huge Losses.
The Absolute State of AAA is not a crash like 1983.
It is uglier.
It is a crash where the revenue line still exists, the executives still smile, and the machine still works just well enough to keep humiliating itself.
Bionic Commando was a flop. Concord was a civilization report.