Date: November 10th, 2026 5:45 PM Author: The Penis
Not Solved yet actually but I wrote this down earlier and thought it sounded Smart. I haven’t loaded the thing into my Harness yet:
Action is a temporally extended process in which an organized system regulates its interventions in an environment according to an objective, using information about the consequences of those interventions to select and revise its behavior.
Date: November 10th, 2026 5:54 PM Author: The Penis
My theory is more General. Most theories of action start with the psychology of human agency and then treat that psychology as constitutive of action itself. I think this is a Mistake. A bacterium navigating a chemical gradient performs Actions. My Harness performs actions that affect my computer too. I think Action is broader than arising from human psychological states. Davidsonian action is just a Special Case of regulated action
Date: November 10th, 2026 5:55 PM Author: Metaphysics is solved
Typically an Action must have a Reason attributable to the Mind involved in the Action. I don't think those things you describe are Actions in the relevant sense.
Date: November 10th, 2026 5:59 PM Author: The Penis
Beliefs, desires, and intentions may be mechanisms through which certain systems perform actions, but I don’t see why they must be necessary conditions for action. You can’t just assume that.
I would distinguish action generally from the narrower category of intentional, reason guided human action. Why should we assume mental states are constitutive of action and not just one way of realizing a more general structure of agency?
Date: November 10th, 2026 6:06 PM Author: The Penis
A stipulative definition cannot, by itself, establish that intentional states are metaphysically necessary for action. My agentic HARNESS selects interventions, executes them, evaluates their consequences, and revises its behavior according to feedback and objectives. That’s a causally organized process with properties that distinguish it from arbitrary events, making it Action under the stipulated definition of My Framework.
Date: November 10th, 2026 6:11 PM Author: The Penis
The physical substrate of a process doesn't, by itself, determine whether that process constitutes an action. That’s not Settled Metaphysics. Human actions are also physically realized through electrochemical activity, neural signaling, and muscular contractions. Describing those processes at the physical level doesn't establish that they are merely events. It doesn’t Solve the Metaphysics.
Date: November 10th, 2026 6:22 PM Author: The Penis
The capacity to perform actions and the capacity to experience, understand, or consciously intend those actions should be distinct. They are clearly separate things.
Date: November 10th, 2026 6:41 PM Author: The Penis
So if a bee gets agitated because I hit it’s nest with a stick, would you say we can’t yet know if this was an action or an event, until we figure out if it has Mental States and at that point we would know the truth? To me it shouldn’t make a difference what it’s level of awareness or internal states are. There is clearly a difference between an animal defensively stinging me and a rock falling on my head. Those cant be both “just events”. The organism is taking an action.
Date: November 10th, 2026 6:45 PM Author: The Penis
It scopes the main discussion to intentional human action but doesnt set a limit on the metaphysics. section 2.4, even discusses genuine agency without representational mental states, including minimal agency in bacteria
Date: November 10th, 2026 7:45 PM Author: The Penis
The SEP does not agree. That one article might try to scope the discussion to human intentional action but not philosophers in general. Aristotle in his Physics argues that processes can be organized toward ends without deliberation. The thing you are saying is all action he calls praxis
Date: November 10th, 2026 7:50 PM Author: The Penis
Anscombe and Davidson are the ones who established the trend in analytic philosophy toward talking about intentional human action as foundational to theory of action. You really think Davidson compares to Aristotle? The minds are not matched.
Date: November 10th, 2026 7:52 PM Author: Metaphysics is solved
I see this constantly. People habitually try to relocate teleology outside themselves. The only place teleology exists is in the mind of people as apparent justification for action. I say apparent because we don't actually know whether mental causation is real, or the extent that it's real. Any further appeal to "processes... organized toward ends without deliberation" -- meaning some kind of teleology "out there" -- has been Debunked.
Date: November 10th, 2026 8:01 PM Author: The Penis
It refutes that specific claim yes. But that does not imply that natural selection cannot produce organisms whose internal mechanisms regulate behavior toward functional outcomes. For instance thermoregulatory systems exist, and they regulate physiological processes in response to temperature changes. That is biological purposiveness
Date: November 10th, 2026 8:03 PM Author: Metaphysics is solved
That definition of "purposeful" as "regulation towards an end" smuggles in intentionality where it doesn't belong. Inanimate matter cannot have "purposes." It is physically causally determined.
Date: November 10th, 2026 8:17 PM Author: The Penis
That’s the mechanism by which the biological function is performed. Not an explanation of why that mechanism has that function. This is eliminativism. Reductionism about biological processes is its own metaphysical position. Pointing to the process doesnt Settle The Metaphysics
Date: November 10th, 2026 8:26 PM Author: The Penis
I don’t think that I need to. I accept that biological functions are physically realized. I reject that explaining their physical realization eliminates their objective functional organization. Physicalism doesn't entail eliminativism about biological purposiveness.
Date: November 10th, 2026 8:12 PM Author: Metaphysics is solved
E.g. you might say the purpose of the kidney is to filter blood. But it's really just deterministically responding to chemical gradients etc. Purpose doesn't exist until you say it does, and that doesn't change what the kidney is doing.
Date: November 10th, 2026 7:37 PM Author: The Penis
What I said is extremely close to Leibniz’s theory of action in the monadology. Main difference is that mine requires causal feedback, where for Leibniz monads don’t causally interact and preestablished harmony says histories of substances correspond without direct causal inference between them.