that would be like Trump not becoming POTUS because John Roberts doesn't like him and refused to swear him in

On the other hand Tusk taking over the court by force using police is some south america-type shit

(https://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5919026&forum_id=2#50234107)

i was pissed of by clip of Obama with young activists talking shit about Poland and Hungary.

(https://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5919026&forum_id=2#50234115)

Based on the text of Poland's Constitution, Prime Minister Donald Tusk's government has the stronger legal argument concerning who has the authority to appoint Constitutional Tribunal judges. However, President Karol Nawrocki's side has a substantial argument under the statute governing judicial oaths.

The complication is that both sides appear to have taken actions that are difficult to reconcile with the written law.

The crisis that escalated in late October 2026 involves three distinct legal questions:

1. Can the president refuse to swear in judges lawfully elected by parliament?

2. Can those judges legally assume office after taking an oath without the president?

3. Can the newly installed judges suspend the president of the Constitutional Tribunal?

The legal answer is not necessarily the same for all three questions.

1. The Constitution favors parliament on judicial appointments

Article 194(1) of Poland's Constitution provides that the Constitutional Tribunal consists of 15 judges elected individually by the Sejm (the lower house of parliament) for nine-year terms.

Importantly, the Constitution does not give Poland's president authority to approve or reject those appointments.

Article 194(2) gives the president authority to appoint the president and vice-president of the Tribunal, but not its ordinary judges.

Moreover, in a 2015 decision (K 34/15), the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the president must accept the oath of a properly elected judge without delay.

My legal assessment: Assuming the Sejm's 2026 appointments were procedurally valid, Nawrocki's refusal to administer the oaths is difficult to defend under the Constitution and that 2015 precedent.

2. But the written statute supports an objection to the government's workaround

Article 4 of Poland's 2016 Act on the Status of Constitutional Tribunal Judges expressly requires newly elected judges to take their oath before the president of Poland.

Article 5 provides that their judicial service begins upon taking that oath.

When Nawrocki refused to receive several judges' oaths, they instead took their oaths at a ceremony in parliament, before a notary and other officials.

The problem is straightforward: the existing statute does not expressly authorize that substitute procedure.

This produces an unusual legal situation:

- Nawrocki may have violated his constitutional duty by refusing to receive the oaths.

- The government's judges may nevertheless have failed to satisfy the statute by taking their oaths elsewhere.

A president's unlawful refusal does not automatically establish that an alternative procedure satisfies the statute. On the other hand, courts may interpret statutory requirements to prevent one official from indefinitely frustrating another constitutional institution's powers.

3. The October 30 suspension is particularly questionable under the written law

This is the more controversial part of the current crisis.

On October 30, newly elected judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska issued orders suspending Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski and Vice-President Bartłomiej Sochański from their duties for one month.

She relied on several statutory provisions, including Article 130 of the law governing ordinary courts, which permits temporary suspension from judicial duties in certain circumstances.

But there are two legal problems:

- Her own authority remains disputed. If her parliamentary oath was invalid, she never acquired the judicial status necessary to issue those orders.

- The suspension power is not explicit. Article 130 does not expressly authorize an ordinary Constitutional Tribunal judge to suspend the Tribunal's president. Her argument depends on applying provisions governing other courts to the Constitutional Tribunal and interpreting who may exercise that power.

Święczkowski's side points to the statutory six-year term of the Tribunal president and the absence of an express removal mechanism allowing another judge to displace him.

On the narrow question of the suspension, the argument against Korwin-Piotrowska's authority is stronger under a strict textual reading, although her side has identified statutory provisions that could support its interpretation. No authoritative resolution of this specific dispute has been established.

(https://xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=5919026&forum_id=2#50235957)